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I. INTRODUCTION
{1} Electronic commerce is the future of business. Today electronic commerce is a $3.6 billion industry. Thousands of businesses use the Internet to buy and sell their wares. As
individuals and businesses increasingly use the Internet for commerce, contracts are moving online too. Because electronic commerce is conducted online, it is infeasible to
make contracts through the traditional paper method. An electronic contract can be sent halfway across the world in seconds; whereas the same contract on paper would take
days or weeks.
{2} The advantages of speed and convenience aside, electronic contracts must still meet the same legal requirements of traditional contracts. The contract is the same, but the
difference is the medium in which the contract is embodied. Electronic and paper-based contracts have common elements, one of which is the requirement of a signature for
contracts dealing with certain subjects.[1]
{3} What is a signature? A signature may be defined as "any mark made with the intention of authenticating the marked document."[2] Marks fulfilling this definition of
"signature" have been used throughout history. For example, to make a contract under Roman law, a citizen pressed his signet ring into a cena, or tablet of wax.[3] During the
Middle Ages, Europeans affixed a seal made of clay to a document; this seal "authenticated" the marked contract.[4] Later, parties to a contract began to write their signatures by
hand in script.[5]
{4} Cryptography, the "art of secret writing,"[6] also has historical roots. People have used two basic forms of cryptography in centuries past: ciphers and codes.[7] Codes are
lists of words used secretly to pass information;[8] whereas a cipher is a method of changing a letter, or group of letters, into "other letters, numbers, or symbols."[9] The ancient
Spartans and the Romans both used a particular cipher.[10] Today, society usually uses ciphers rather than codes.[11]
{5} Electronic signatures present the latest embodiment of the signature and cipher. An electronic signature can be any electronic mark signifying agreement. This definition
covers a wide range of signature types -- from digitized images of a handwritten signature to a retinal scan of signatories. Some electronic signatures are very secure. A retinal
scan, for example, is almost impossible to duplicate. Other electronic signatures provide for less security. For instance, a handwritten signature can be scanned, input into a

personal computer and used to "sign" documents.
{6} One particular type of electronic signature that uses the principles of a cipher is the digital signature. The digital signature may be defined technically as:
A transformation of a message using an asymmetric cryptosystem and a hash function such that a person having the initial message and the signer's public key can
accurately determine:
(1) whether the transformation was created using the private key that corresponds to the signer's public key, and
(2) whether the initial message has been altered since the transformation was made.[12]
{7} It is important to distinguish between a digital signature and other types of electronic signatures. A digital signature is not the same as an electronically-stored handwritten
signature.[13] A digital signature is a secure communication unlike many other types of electronic signatures. Digital signatures ensure that contracts, images, letters, and many
other forms of electronic documents can be signed and sent to another party within seconds without fear of compromise of security. The digitally signed contract is legally valid
and can be read only by the intended recipient.

II. ENCRYPTION AND THE TECHNICAL FRAMEWORK OF DIGITAL SIGNATURES
A. Knowing the ABCs: Algorithms, Bits, and Ciphertext
{8} A digital signature is an electronic communication, which consists of "bits" of data. In its most fundamental state, a "bit" is a "0" or "1." Computers interpret these bits into
strings of data, which are essentially a series of linked "0's" and "1's."[14] An electronic communication takes place when a computer transmits data in the form of bits[15]
through metal or fiber-optic wires to another computer's microprocessor. The computer's microprocessor "translates" the numerical "string" into words and phrases. Thus, a
digital signature is essentially a unique sequence of bits, created as an identifier of a certain message from a certain individual by a computer, and communicated via computer to
another party.
{9} The science of encryption assures the security of a digitally signed message or document. There are, generally, two types of encryption: symmetric key cryptography and
asymmetric cryptography, otherwise known as public-key encryption ("PKE").[16] Digital signatures are formed through PKE. The framework of PKE services is commonly
known as a public key infrastructure ("PKI").[17] PKE technology manipulates data into numerical digests and vice-versa,[18] with algorithms as the key mechanisms used to
manipulate the data.[19] "Schemes" are particular algorithms, or series of algorithms, used to manipulate data in digital signature technology.[20] One of the most common
schemes currently used in PKE is the RSA scheme.[21]
{10} The basic operation behind this scheme is the use of a "key" as an exponent that is applied mathematically to the number representing the message.[22] The message in its
initial, or numerical, state is called "plaintext."[23] The number resulting from the enciphering process is called the "ciphertext."[24] In the RSA scheme, the ciphertext is a
number that is mathematically manipulated with some other random number by an algorithm; this "other" number is also needed as part of the key.[25] Together, the two
numbers form the private key.[26] The other number formed as a result of the applied algorithm is a part of the public key[27] and is used to decipher the ciphertext and to
recreate the original plaintext message. At this point, a practical consideration to make is that the number of digits in one or more of the numbers comprising the ciphertext must
be large enough to defeat attempts to "hack," or to find the private key to the message.[28] If the process is followed precisely, the hacker would have to go through each and
every possible combination, permutation, and algorithm to decipher the number.[29]
B. Hashing
{11} Hashing is another technical process used to make a digital signature.[30] Hashing refers to the process of creating a string of characters, also called a digest, by mapping
from the full plain-text message (i.e., the use of an algorithm).[31] The algorithm used to form the digest from the plaintext message is usually designed with the seal function in
mind.[32] Thus, if any character in a digitally signed message is changed, the digest also changes. Throughout the process, it is essential that each individual plaintext message
results in a single, unique digest.[33] Typically, each digest is compiled in a fixed length in a size small enough to be enciphered as the message substitute in the construction of
the actual digital signature with the private key.[34] This compilation allows a very large plaintext message to be represented in the digital signature formation by a short string
that is known to the user or the user's digital signature software.[35]
{12} To decipher the message, the recipient must know the hashing algorithm.[36] The hashing algorithm is applied to the full plaintext part of the received message. It is this
process that results in a digest.[37] The resulting digest is then used to verify the digital signature. As previously stated, if even one bit has been changed since the message was
signed, the signature will not be verified.[38]
{13} The authentication of a digital signature using PKE is important. In order to rely on a PKE-signed message, the receiver must be able to associate the public key with the
sender/author.[39] Handwritten signatures are readily identifiable with an individual, as each person's signature is unique. However, digital signatures are essentially large
numbers, which appear to be an algorithm to the ordinary observer. A digital signature does not contain any handwriting or other unique properties that can be readily associated
with a particular individual. Thus, a digital signature must be associated with an individual to be effective.
C. Verification and the Role of Certification Authorities as Trusted Third Parties
{14} This association of a digital signature with an individual's identity must also be verified. Utilizing current asymmetric encryption technology, such as digital signature
software, anyone can create a public key-private key pair in the name of any particular person.[40] In other words, anyone can download digital signature software from the Net
and create a digital signature for "Joe C. Smith." The signature can even be uploaded to certain databases of public keys.[41] But, how does anyone confirm that the individual
who created the key is "Joe C. Smith?" Without independent verification, the public key of Joe C. Smith may be a fraud perpetrated by another individual purporting to be Joe C.
Smith. Consequently, a receiving party may rely unknowingly on a fraudulent signature. Therefore, digitally signed messages purporting to be associated with an individual
identity should be attested to by a trusted third party ("TTP") to minimize the occurrences of fraudulent representations.
{15} Certification authorities ("CAs") are the most common way to provide this authentication. A CA is a TTP that acts as a repository of public keys and authenticates the
relationship between a particular public key and its supplier.[42] The CA must ascertain the true identity of the subscriber and certify that a public key-private key pair belongs
to that person.[43] First, the subscriber must generate her own public key-private key pair. The subscriber then visits the CA and produces proof of identity. Most CAs require an
official document with picture identification, such as a driver's license and/or passport.[44] Finally, the CA will require a demonstration that the subscriber holds the private key
corresponding to the public key.[45] This demonstration is difficult because the key owner cannot disclose the private key.[46] One way of accomplishing this is by sending a
digitally signed electronic message in the presence of the CA.[47]
{16} A certificate is issued by the CA upon verification of the association between an identified person and public key.[48] A certificate is an electronically stored record
attesting to the connection between the public key and subscriber.[49] The certificate also contains the subscriber's public key and may contain other relevant information, such
as the key expiration date,[50] size, and/or signature generation software identifier.[51] According to the ABA's Digital Signature Guidelines, a CA
may give notice of the creation and contents of a certificate by giving the subscriber a printed representation of the certificate, by allowing the subscriber to view the
contents of the certificate online, . . . or by communicating the content of the certificate to the subscriber in any other reasonable way, such as by first-class mail.[52]

Generally, the CA is not required generally to publish a certificate upon its issuance.[53] The CA does, however, attach its own digital signature to the certificate if it is sent
electronically.[54] The subscriber must then review the contents of the certificate to ensure accuracy before the certificate is made publicly available.[55] The subscriber must
accept the certificate for both verification and validation.[56] After the subscriber has reviewed the contents of the certificate and is certain of the certificate's accuracy, she "may
publish the certificate, or direct the CA to do so. . . ."[57] Once the CA publishes the certificate, it represents that the certificate has been accepted by the subscriber, and the
certificate is given a presumption of validity.[58]
{17} When a certificate is published, it is made available to third parties. A certificate is published when it is recorded in a repository, or otherwise circulated, and made
accessible to all parties desiring to correspond with the subscriber.[59] A repository is "an electronic database of certificates - the equivalent of [an online] digital Yellow Pages"
accessible to the general public.[60] However, unlike the Yellow Pages, a user may be charged for access to the information.[61]
{18} A private key, like a physical key, must be physically safe guarded. If a private key becomes known to another party, the security of all communications using that private
key is compromised. When the private key is either lost or compromised, the individual should suspend or revoke the certificate corresponding to the key-pair immediately. The
certificates stored at a repository usually contain the status of the certificate, such as whether the certificate is "valid," "suspended," or "revoked."[62] Revoked certificates are
also stored on a Certificate Revocation List ("CRL"), which is a separate database of certificates and their corresponding public keys that have been revoked before their
expiration date.[63]
{19} A CA may be liable for negligence in performing its functions or for misrepresentation in the issuance of certificates containing false or misleading information.[64] The
CA may also be liable for breach of contract between the CA and the subscriber. Statutory provisions may limit the liability of a CA, depending upon the relevant jurisdiction.
[65] If a statute is inapplicable, a CA may attempt to mitigate potential liability by specifying a limit in its contract with a subscriber.[66] A CA's certification practice statement
often contains a disclaimer of liability.[67] The CA will claim usually that this disclaimer limits any potential liability to a third party who relies on a certificate issued by the
CA.[68] This notification of limitation may be enforceable when a CA defends itself against a relying party, depending, in part, on whether the relying party had notice of the
CA's limitation of liability disclaimer.[69]

III. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. The Functions of a PKI Digital Signature
1. Integrity, Authenticity, and Verification
{20} The digital signature, like a handwritten signature, fulfills certain legal roles. First, a digital signature assures the integrity of a communication. Digitally signing the
message ensures that the contents of the message are concealed and secure.[70] As previously mentioned,[71] a document that is in any way altered after it has been digitally
signed using public key encryption will be unverifiable. This is particularly applicable in situations where an author is required to prove at a later date that the intended recipient
of the communication did not alter the message after its receipt.
{21} Authenticity is another function of a digital signature. A connection between the digitally signed document and signer must be shown. Digital signatures provide a
significantly greater reliability of authenticity than conventional, hand-signed documents, because of the mathematical improbability of forgery.[72] A CA is the TTP that
provides the verification of the link between public key and signer identity.[73]
{22} Yet, a question remains: how can the identity and authority of the CA be verified? One way to verify an issuing authority, such as a CA is certification by another "higherlevel" CA. This hierarchy of verification can continue until a certain point, and then must logically end with a "final" CA. This "final" CA must be well-known and highly trusted
by commercial entities.[74]
{23} What is required of a CA? The ABA's Digital Signature Guidelines establishes a model legal structure for CAs.[75] The Guidelines state that, "[s]ubject to applicable law,
any person who undertakes the functions of a certification authority . . . may become a certification authority."[76] The Guidelines further specify that the authority and reliance
accorded the certificate of a CA is determined by the CA's experience and reputation, as well as by material contained within a certification practice statement.[77] A second
method of CA verification is by statute, such as the Utah Digital Signature Act.[78] Many digital signature statutes list certain issuing authorities as official CAs.[79]
{24} Another function of a digital signature is the seal function. A digital signature performs the seal function either through the "hash function"[80] or by enciphering the entire
plaintext message,[81] and verifies that the message has not changed since the sender's private key signed the message. The sender of the digitally signed message is assured that
the recipient cannot modify the message because the recipient only has access to the sender's public key. Throughout the entire transaction, the private key is never disclosed.
Conversely, the recipient is assured that the message has not been intercepted and modified by a third party.[82] If, at a later date, a party needs to produce a copy of the
message, a verification of the digital signature will confirm that the message remains preserved, uncorrupted, and, therefore, unmodified.[83] This means that a party can
produce a digitally signed communication in court and establish that the document is prima facie valid.
2. Non-Repudiation
{25} Another function of a digital signature is the presumption of non-repudiation. When the author/sender of the document affixes her signature to the message, she is
presumed to intend to authenticate the document with all of the accompanying rights and duties.[84] An attempt by the signatory of a digitally signed document to repudiate her
authentication, or her intent to do so, is more difficult than an attempt to repudiate a hand-signed document, as it is highly improbable that anyone other than the signatory could
have signed and sent the digitally signed document. The physical security of PKE technology means that the document must have been signed with the sender's/signatory's
private key.[85]
{26} It is theoretically possible for another party to discover a private key, even though the key's holder has conscientiously safeguarded it. The key may be broken through a
"brute force" attack. In such an attack, every possible key is tried until the correct key decrypts the ciphertext.[86] The longer the key, the less the probability of a successful
brute force attack. The length of the key is directly proportional to the amount of time required to break that key. For example, a 56-bit long key would take approximately ten
hours to break in a brute force attack,[87] whereas a 128-bit long key would take 5.4 multiplied by 10^18 years to break.[88]
{27} The only viable defense to a cause of action for breach of contract is the forgery of the digital signature owner's identity. According to the ABA's Digital Signature
Guidelines, if the owner's private key has been compromised or lost, the "forger" has signed on his behalf only.[89] The owner of the signature, nevertheless, is legally presumed
to have signed a message if the owner is a "subscriber of a valid certificate, and the digital signature can be verified by reference to a public key listed in the certificate . . . ."[90]
This presumption may be rebutted upon a showing of sufficient evidence.[91] The subscriber, furthermore, has a duty to notify promptly, "upon reasonable suspicion" any CAs
holding a public key corresponding to the compromised or suspect private key.[92] Additionally, it is important to determine whether the alleged signatory intentionally
disclosed his/her private key. The Digital Signature Guidelines differentiate between intentional and accidental disclosure of a private key: "[p]ersons who intentionally discloses
[sic] their private keys, with or without fraudulent intent, should be held to a higher standard [of care] than an involuntary discloser."[93]
3. Ceremony
{28} Another function of a digital signature is the ceremonial function. At least one expert, however, believes that a document is more likely to be signed accidentally with the
digital signature than with a traditional handwritten signature.[94] Yet, regardless of a digital signature's ease of use, a standard of reasonable care for an individual's private key
is necessary to preserve the ceremonial function of a digital signature.[95] Therefore, the ABA Digital Signature Guidelines establish a presumption of intent to affix one's
signature.[96] This presumption, nevertheless, may be rebutted by a sufficient evidentiary showing.[97] The result of such a presumption is that, in cases of an "accidental"
signing, the individual is required to show evidence that the signing was indeed an accident. Because it will be difficult for the signer to meet the requisite burden of proving

accident, the signer should exercise great care to avoid such an accidental signing.
{29} There are several safeguards an individual can undertake to decrease the probability of accidental signing. Private keys are stored usually on a computer's fixed disk or hard
drive in a folder called a "key-ring."[98] By removing all private keys to a remote device, such as a floppy diskette or magnetic card, an individual is required to perform several
distinct actions to digitally sign a document, thereby significantly reducing the likelihood of accidental signing.
B. Evidentiary Issues
{30} Despite the many advantages of digital signatures, they lack several important features. For example, the lack of a built-in, verifiable time/date stamp is a flaw in current
digital signature technology. Although a digitally signed message is dated at the moment of sending, the date and time can be manipulated easily, and therefore, are
untrustworthy.[99] The only currently available method for verifying a digital signature is an independent time/date stamp from a CA.[100] The CA must first verify the time
and date the message was received from the subscriber. The CA then forwards the message with the time/date stamp to the intended recipient.[101]
{31} Although even this method of CA verification can present problems. One implication of the inability to ensure an accurate date/time stamp on a digitally signed message is
the difficulty in proving the exact time the message was sent. A CA's date/time stamp only shows when the message was received from the subscriber. Thus, a party relying upon
the date/time stamp of the CA can only prove that the message was sent by the subscriber at some date or time prior to date or time stamped on the message. A litigant
attempting to prove the exact time the message was signed by the author would have to rely upon extrinsic evidence.[102]
{32} The use of a digital signature in commerce, like a handwritten signature, is subject to the Uniform Commercial Code,[103] Statute of Frauds,[104] and the Parol Evidence
Rule.[105] Under the laws of most states, the common law forms for assigning real property have been superceded by statutory forms for deeds.[106] Therefore, the formal
requirements of a signed writing needed to accompany an assignment of real property have a legal basis separate from the Statute of Frauds.[107] The ABA Digital Signature
Guidelines do not address the possibility of circumventing the statutory deed signing requirement through the use of a digital signature.[108] Because a digital signature satisfies,
and to some extent exceeds,[109] the requirements of a traditional signature, future statutory amendments should authorize the use of digital signatures in real property
assignments.
{33} The Parol Evidence Rule allows courts to consider evidence (i.e., digital signatures) beyond that found in the contract in some situations.[110] Under the Parol Evidence
Rule, extrinsic evidence is deemed inadmissible to effect a determination of the intention of the subscribing parties in their contract.[111] A digitally signed document can satisfy
two requirements. First, a digitally signed document satisfies the "writing" requirement.[112] Secondly, a digital signature may authenticate the document.[113]
{34} Another evidentiary application of digital signatures is the Best Evidence Rule.[114] The Federal Rules of Evidence expressly provide that, "[i]f data are stored in a
computer or similar device, any printout or other output readable by sight, shown to reflect the data accurately, is an original."[115] Although an electronic message is
authenticated, a party must still overcome the hearsay rule if it is to be admissible.[116] It is also necessary to survive hearsay objections, as electronic messages may themselves
constitute hearsay (i.e., hearsay within hearsay).[117] Additionally, the message itself may contain references to statements that are hearsay. A party may find an applicable
hearsay exception that will admit the electronic communication as evidence for the jury's consideration. One such example is the Business Records Exception,[118] which is
applicable to electronic communications used in the regular course of business. A computer record will be admissible generally under this exception if it was the regular business
practice to create the computer information.[119] However, if the court finds that the source of the information, method, or circumstances of the preparation indicate a lack of
veracity, the record(s) will be excluded.[120] Thus, there is no reason why a digitally signed electronic document should be treated differently than other types of business
records.[121]

IV. A SURVEY OF ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE LEGISLATION
A. Legislative Categorization: Neutrality, Neutrality Plus, and PKI-Technology
{35} There are various legal structures for digital signatures. Since the enactment of the Utah Digital Signature Act,[122] more than forty states have enacted some form of
electronic signature legislation.[123] The types of legislation differ from state to state. Nevertheless, current state electronic signature laws may be classified into three general
categories. The first category of statutes are "technology neutral."[124] These statutes give legal effect to any electronic signature, but they allow a court to decide what
evidentiary weight to give the signature based upon the security of the technology utilized. The second category of statutes specifies that a valid signature must have certain
security attributes, but does not require a particular technology. Such statutes tend to require the attributes of PKI-digital signatures, such as user authentication and messagealteration prevention.[125] The third group of statutes requires the use of PKI-digital signatures.[126]
{36} The following illustrations present the electronic signature laws of three states, with each state's statutes adopting one of the three available approaches. Utah, for example,
has adopted the third approach. The Utah Digital Signature Act ("Utah Act") was the first comprehensive statute on digital signatures.[127] The Utah Act established specific
duties of CAs and subscribers,[128] license and regulation procedures for certification authorities,[129] legal presumptions on parties,[130] and the legal validity of digitally
signed documents.[131] Many of the provisions of the Utah Act were later adopted by the ABA in its Digital Signature Guidelines.[132]
{37} California, however, has adopted the second approach. The California Digital Signature regulations[133] are not as detailed as the Utah Act. The California regulations
define a "digitally signed communication" as "a message that has been processed by a computer in such a manner that ties the message to the individual that signed the
message."[134] Currently, California recognizes two digital signature technologies: public key cryptography and "signature dynamics."[135] The regulations also provide a
procedure for adding new technologies to the list of acceptable technologies. With respect to digital signatures, the California regulations impose the duty to exercise reasonable
care in retaining control of the private key, and preventing its disclosure to any person not authorized to create the subscriber's digital signature upon all persons who hold key
pairs.[136] Comparable to the Utah Digital Signature Act, the California regulations also establish an approved list of CAs authorized to issue certificates for digitally signed
communications with public entities in California. To qualify as an approved CA, an applicant must undergo a thorough audit.[137] A CA may avoid the audit by providing
proof of accreditation by a national or international accreditation body that is deemed acceptable to the State of California.[138] It is significant to note, however, that the
California regulations do not specifically address liability concerns. The legislative commentary for the regulations suggest remedies in the form of contractual provisions with
service providers. The California legislature is expected to establish additional sections dealing with liability.[139] Currently several additional digital signature bills are pending
in the California Assembly.
{38} In contrast, the Commonwealth of Virginia takes the least technology-specific approach. The Virginia provisions employ "technology-neutral language."[140] Virginia
Code Sections 59.1-467 and 59.1-468, define "digital signature" as "any electronic identifier, created by a computer" and "signed" as "any symbol or method . . . adopted by a
party with present intention to be bound by or to authenticate a record. . . ."[141] Section 59.1-468 grants full legal effect to digital signatures: "[w]here law requires a signature,
or provides for certain consequences in the absence of a signature, that law is satisfied by a digital signature."[142]
B. Attempts for a Uniform Digital Signature Law
1. U.S. Proposals
{39} Because each state has a different law on electronic signatures, some groups are attempting to unify and to standardize the various laws into a uniform law. The National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) and the American Law Institute ("ALI") have promulgated separately two "model laws" addressing electronic
signatures, the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act ("UETA") and the Uniform Computer Information Act ("UCITA").[143]
{40} Although primarily addressing licensing aspects of information transactions, UCITA encourages the implementation of digital signatures. The provisions of UCITA do not

favor digital signatures over electronic signatures.[144] In fact, UCITA does not attempt to override the existing laws of individual states, as it leaves existing provisions intact.
Despite the fact that UCITA provides a model law for software licensing, an area that currently has very little relevant legislation, the prospects for UCITA appear dim because
there are significant issues of consumer protection and federal preemption that have not been adequately addressed.[145]
{41} In addition, Congress is also weighing in on digital signatures. Currently, there are several major bills in Congress addressing digital signatures.[146] In 1999, two
important bills were introduced in the House of Representatives. The Digital Signature Act of 1999[147] and the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce
Act[148] are "national" digital signature bills. Both require the "adoption and utilization of digital signatures by Federal agencies and ... encourage the use of digital signatures in
private sector electronic transactions." Under the Digital Signature Act of 1999, federal agencies would be required to allow digital signatures in place of a written signature.
Both bills, furthermore, would establish several "panels" to study and to encourage the use of digital signatures. Both bills are still pending before the House Commerce
Committee.[149]
2. International Initiatives
{42} Therefore, it should come as no surprise that there are also various international provisions relating to digital signatures. Digital signatures are particularly attractive to
parties engaged in international electronic commerce. The distances and physical barriers between states such as border patrols, customs, and oceans are significantly diminished
through electronic communication. Many countries are exploiting the full advantages of these communication tools - digital signatures. For example, Argentina, Australia,
Canada, Colombia, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Russia, Singapore, Sweden, and the United Kingdom all have some form of
enacted or pending digital signature legislation.[150]
{43} The European Union ("EU") also has established a framework for electronic and digital signatures.[151] On May 13, 1998, the European Commission released its report
for a "Directive of Digital and Electronic Signatures" ("Directive").[152] In its report, the Commission recognized the increasing amount of digital signature legislation in
member states of the EU, as well as the need for a uniform legal structure in the "Internal Market" for digital signatures.[153] Additionally, the Commission recommended
technology-neutral standards.[154] The Commission differentiated between closed and open systems, where the closed commerce systems would be specifically excluded from
the coverage of the Directive.[155]
{44} The primary focus of the EU Directive was unifying the divergent initiatives in the EU member states.[156] Divergence was particularly evident in regards to requirements
on service providers and products, the condition under which electronic signatures will have legal effect, and structure of accreditation schemes.[157] Other problematic areas in
which the Commission urged expedient "harmonization" were the different liability rules and the risk of uncertain jurisdiction concerning liability, where services are provided
among different member states.[158] According to the Commission, "[i]t also seem[ed] likely that Member States [would] set up different technical conditions under which
electronic signatures will be presumed secure."[159]
{45} The EU Directive, in addition, establishes a legal framework for electronic signatures.[160] "Certification Service Providers" would offer their services without being
required to obtain prior authorization from a Member State's government.[161] Service providers may benefit from the legal validity granted to the "associated electronic
signatures" through "voluntary accreditation schemes linked to common requirements."[162] Any accreditation, accordingly, would be regarded as a public service offered for
certification service providers which would like to provide high-level services.[163] Through the implementation of these policies, service providers will be able to take
advantage of this new type of accreditation.
{46} The EU Directive also encourages certification service providers to offer a much wider range of services than a CA in the United States.[164] Certificates may include
name, address, social-security number, tax and credit information, and specific licenses/ certifications.[165] Key concepts throughout the EU Directive are flexibility and
standardization across borders.
{47} The EU Directive has been "fleshed out" by a subsequent study by European industry and standardization bodies. In its Final Report, the European Electronic Signature
Standardization Initiative Expert Team set out "detailed standards and open specifications" for electronic signatures.[166] Instead of recommending or developing new
standards, the EESSI Report urges the EU and its member states to use existing "recognized international standards."[167] Specifically, the EESSI Report establishes digital
signatures using asymmetric cryptography (i.e., PKI-digital signatures) as the technical framework. In essence, the Report, although expressly stating a "technology neutral
approach," favors asymmetric cryptography as the "first set" technology for "qualified electronic signatures."[168] The Report specifically addresses the establishment of profiles
for PKI operational management protocols based on a specific PKI technology.[169] Thus, products using PKI-digital signatures would obtain the status and legal rights granted
to "qualified electronic signatures."
{48} The United Nations ("UN") is also developing an electronic signature framework. The UN General Assembly adopted a Model Law on Electronic Commerce ("Model
Law") in 1996.[170] Since 1997, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") has worked on Draft Uniform Rules for Electronic Signatures
("Draft Uniform Rules"), a set of model rules for homogeneity in international commerce.[171] Most of the terms enumerated within the Draft Uniform Rules are defined
according to the Model Law.[172] Although the latest proposal of the Draft Uniform Rules[173] contains diverse sections from various nations, the Draft Uniform Rules employ
certain principals, one of which is "media-neutrality."[174] Specifically excluding administrative, consumer, and criminal law, and public policy,[175] the Draft Uniform Rules
are specifically limited in scope to private international commercial law.[176] The Draft Uniform Rules propose that parties consider a type of parol evidence, such as custom of
the parties or custom of the trade, in the reliance receiving parties place in the authenticity of certificates.[177] The Draft Uniform Rules provide three variants, all of which
basically establish a "presumption of signing" if "an enhanced digital signature is attached or logically associated with the data message," reserving two cases in which the
presumption does not apply[178] and yielding several "variants" for establishing liability.[179] Section III of the Draft Uniform Rules establishes general standards of practice
for certification authorities.[180] Additionally, the Draft Uniform Rules set forth a presumption of integrity for digitally signed messages.[181] Finally, Articles Eleven and
Twelve establish contractual liabilities on certification authorities.[182]
{49} A review of each article of the Draft Rules reveals an astonishing similarity to the ABA's Digital Signature Guidelines.[183] Although the Draft Rules differ in specific
terminology (e.g., "enhanced electronic signature" rather than "digital signature"), the basic legal frameworks of the two proposals are quite similar. The refutable presumptions
of authenticity and integrity and the reliance upon certification authorities are but two examples of the similarity between the UN's Draft Uniform Rules and the ABA's Digital
Signature Guidelines.

V. CONCLUSION
{50} The digital signature has become a significant tool in U.S. and international commerce. Because a digital signature provides the legal elements of a traditional handwritten
signature (i.e., evidence, ceremony, approval, and efficiency) and enhanced security, integrity, and authenticity, additional businesses will likely use digital signatures in an
increasing percentage of their commercial transactions. Secure electronic commerce provides a "paperless" way of transacting business.
{51} Electronic communications may be sent and received in a fraction of the time, as compared with traditional methods. A digitally signed contract may be e-mailed from a
business in Beijing to a recipient in New York in less than one minute, while the same document could take a day (or even longer) to arrive if sent through a commercial delivery
service. The very small amount of time required to send a digitally signed message to a recipient, as previously examined, has broad implications on the law of contracts. In
short, the digital signature is the means to an end; a signature is not part of a transaction's substance, but rather, the authentication of a transaction.[184]
{52} Currently, the PKI-digital signature is the best type of signature for electronic contracts. PKI-digital signature software is inexpensive and the technology is mathematically
improbable to break.[185] With future advances in technology, other types of electronic signatures may replace the PKI-digital signature. Regardless of the technology used,
digital and electronic signatures are an increasingly significant part of commerce and will continue to evolve.
-W. Everett Lupton
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message did not originate from that person, and the receiver has had "reasonable time to act accordingly;" and, excepting messages in cases where "the addressee knew or should
have known," had reasonable care been exercised, that the message was not from the apparent originator). Id.
[179]. See id. at Part II, Ch. II, Section II, Art. 7.
[180]. See generally id. at Part II, Ch. II, Art. 3 (explaining that the presumption of authenticity is invalidated if: 1. "the [originator] [holder] can establish that the [secure
electronic signature] [private key] was used without authorization and that the [originator] [holder] could not have avoided such use by exercising reasonable care;" or, 2. "the
relying party knew or should have known, had it sought information from the [originator] [certification authority] or otherwise exercised reasonable care, that the [secure
electronic] [digital] signature was not that of the [originator] [holder of the private key]"). Id.
[181]. See id. at Part. II, Ch. II, Section II, Art. 5, para. 35.
[182]. See generally id. at Part II, Chapter III, Arts. 11-12 (detailing where Article 11 addresses rights and obligations which are as to the agreement between parties, certificate
of authority which may, by agreement, limit liability (but not from intentional recklessness, and where Article 12 addresses liability in the absence of a liability agreement).
[183]. See supra note 2.
[184]. See Digital Signature Guidelines, supra note 2, at 5.
[185]. See supra Section II.
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